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Abstract
This report asserts that a fundamental flaw exists in current systemic com-
bat models - the use of the so-called present-state decisionmaking paradigm. This
paradigm is shown not only to be unrealistic and but also to rely on hidden models.
The report also presents and examines a proposed alternative - the future-state
decisionmaking architecture of the Generalized Value System [GVS]. This architec-
ture is shown to be more realistic than present-state decisionmaking, yet practical
to implement. The necessary elements of the GVS are discussed in details, and
an example presented. Areas of the proposed GVS architecure which will require
additional research are also discussed.

I. Introduction
A primary problem facing military force planners is that they must guess about
the scenarios, threat, available systems, political and economic environments and
national resolves which will exist at some future time. These force planners commit
billions of dollars today to procure weapon systems, based on hypothesized scenarios
for ten years hence, with the primary intent of assuring that those systems are
sufficiently effective that the postulated situation will not occur.
Combat models play a major, and increasing, role in assisting decisionmaking
in this arena of developing doctrine and systems. Force planners have investigated a
wide variety of approaches to modelling combat - historical curve fitting (e.g. QJM,
[3]); man-in-the-loop (MITL) models (e.g. JANUS, [16]); systemic (no man-in-the-
loop) simulations (e.g. VIC, [17]); and analytic models (e.g. COMAN, [1]). Efforts
to develop a theory of combat have been attempting for years to make a science out
of a very infrequent (at least by the standards of other sciences, which generally
can conduct repeatable and controllable experiments) occurrence in history.
There are numerous tradeoffs between systemic and MITL models. MITL
models are generally easier to set up and run. Human players can make do with
less complete and less extensive data bases than systemic models. Live players are
able to react to unforseen or new circumstances with much more flexibility than
systemic models, where unforseen situations may require extensive recoding of the
program logic. Currently, most systemic models must frequently be stopped and
then restarted when, according to the judgement of analysts, the model fails to take
reasonable or realistic military actions. Experience has shown that extensive use of
this stop/restart capability effectively turns a systemic model into an MITL model,
and not necessarily an efficient one at that.
On the other hand, MITL models have at least two significant drawbacks - the
difficulty of replicating results and the lack of a clearly defined audit trail regarding
critical command and control decisions. This makes the use of such models for force
structure analysis extremely difficult, since cause and effect are effectively obscured.
and the contribution of a new weapon system or doctrine to the result is almost
impossible to separate from the dynamic of the individual players, the "fog" of even
simulated battle, or the occurrence of pure luck. For these reasons, despite their
difficulties, systemic models seem to be the overwhelming choice for use in force
structure analyses.
This report addresses only one aspect of the larger problems outlined above.
Specifically, we are concerned with methodologies for modelling decisionmaking
in systemic combat simulations. We propose that most current systemic models
utilize a fundamentally flawed paradigm for decisionmaking - one which we feel
must be altered if these models are to be fully credible and effective, especially
at the Division and Corps level. We shall also examine what we feel is a mon
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reasonable, yet achievable, architecture for decisionmaking in systemic models.
II. Present-State Decisionmaking
Command and control decisionmaking in current systemic models follows what
we shall call the present-state decisionmaking paradigm. That is, the model makes
tactical decisions by examining the values of various attributes of modeled entities
and comparing these to certain (generally multiple) test and threshhold values. The
logic for these decisions is normally implemented using what are called either tactical
decision rules (TDR's) [17], or decision tables, which are in reality little more than
"IF ... THEN" constructs. When decisions made in this manner are considered by
professional military analysts to be flawed, the normal response is to "fix" the model.
These "fixes" may involve either altering the program so as to change the actual
logic of the "IF ... THEN" flow, or creating what are often called "external event
files," which simply "hard-wire" the model to make a specific, "proper" decision
at a specific (model) time. Unfortunately, the use of such "fixes" can cause a near
exponential growth in code complexity. In addition, many of these "fixes," especially
those implemented via the external event file approach, are highly unstable in that
minor variants in the model run (often caused by other external event file events)
may negate, or fail to trigger the "fix" correctly. Lastly, establishing a clear audit
trail of why specific decisions were made becomes increasingly difficult as the number
of "fixes" grows.
We believe that most of these difficulties arise because of a single fundamental
weakness in this structure. Specifically, the attribute values which are tested against
the TDR's are the current values, i.e. the values at the same (model) time at which
the decision is being made (and probably at which the model will implement it). We
claim this is not realistic, and that this manner of use of current values is the primary
contributor to most of the "bad" tactical decisions which are made in systemic
models. Furthermore, we assert that this methodology effectively includes other,
hidden models, some of which may have existed only in the analyst/programmer's
mind and are therefore neither able to be validated nor subject to the establishment
of audit trails. Lastly, we claim that the experiences to date with decisionmaking
in systemic models strongly supports the conjecture that the continued use of the
present-state paradigm, coupled with the kind of "fixes" described above, is a dead-
end approach.
III. A Model for "Realistic" Decisionmaking
Given what we believe to be the fundamentally flawed nature of the present-
state decisionmaking model, we now develop what we contend is a more reasonable
architecture for decisionmaking in systemic models. The starting point for our ap-
proach is the view that in the "rear" world, the current state acts only as a "trigger"
to initiate a planning process. As part of this planning, almost all actual decisions
are made based, not on the actual current state of the world, but on the perception
of the trends (i.e. the future) that may be developing. We further claim that this
paradigm, which we denote future-state decisionmaking to distinguish it from the
present-state model, is practical to implement in most systemic models, and that
its implementation will greatly enhance the credibility of that class of models. The
concept of future-state decisionmaking is a cornerstone of the Generalized Value
System [GVS] which we are developing as part of the ALARM [G] project, an ongo-
ing, multifaceted effort involving Naval Postgraduate School faculty and students,
and contractors.
The development of an architecture for more realistic combat model decision-
making requires blending both of the above described basic elements of actual de-
cisionmaking - the current situation triggering a decision to initiate a planning pro-
cess, and then perhaps to initiate an action so as to change a currently anticipated
future - with the basic limitations of current computer simulation - most algorithms
must be reduced to quantitative computation. Our starting point will be to formally
structure a concept which we have lifted from the discipline of control theory - the
state of an entity. In actual decisionmaking situations, this concept is "fuzzy," but
at this point we shall understand it simply to encompass all those attributes of any
entity which are known (or felt to be known) by the decision maker. In the more
restrictive modelling context this term will represent those relevant attributes of an
entity which are in fact represented in the model. The fundamental point about the
state, either in the actual or model context, is that it represents attributes of an
entity which we are able, either subjectively or objectively, to measure. As perhaps
intimated above, we feel changes (or lack of changes) in this state must be viewed
primarily as the "trigger 11 in actual situations for the start of planning processes.
We further propose the following, greatly simplified, view of that entire processs.
1. The process starts when a either a change (or lack thereof) in the
state, or a predetermined time checkpoint causes the decision maker to
review the current situation. In certain cases, this review will cause him
to conclude that, in some sense, "things are not going well. 11
2. This recognition, however, does not, in and of itself, generate an
instantaneous decision, but only the recognition that some (as yet unspec-
ified) decision may have to be made.
3. In the planning or evaluation procedure thus generated, the deci-
sionmaker tries to determine what if any changes he can effect that will
"make things better. 11
4. At the completion of this, the decisionmaker choose the "best 11
option from among all changes than can "make things better. 11
While the above may seem absurdly simple, the fact remains that nothing close
to this viewpoint is incorporated in current production systemic models. We also
believe that another crucial failing in present-state decisionmaking as it is imple-
mented in current systemic combat models is the lack of recognition that, in all but
the simplest actual cases, i.e. cases of almost purely automatic reaction ("battle
drills"), both the decision and the implementing actions actually occur in the future,
and frequently the actions must be initiated a significant time before their desired ef-
fects occur. We feel than any truly credible systemic combat model decisionmaking
architecture must capture these aspects.
There are other fundamental consequences of this view that the proper role
of the current state is to create, if necessary, the perception that "things are not
going well." The first of these is that, for this kind of decisionmaking process to
occur, there must first exist some view of how things "should be going," i.e. of
how the state should be evolving with time, including how it should be evolving
into the future. In the military context, this implies, as is almost always the case,
the existence of a plan or mission that must be accomplished. But, at the risk
of becoming redundant, we again emphasize that this also assumes the ability to
consider not only how things are now, but how they appear to be developing into
the future. That is, there must exist methodologies or algorithms for projecting the
current state into the future, and then comparing that future state to the "plan." (In
actual military decisionmaking, this procedure is frequently labeled war gaming.)
The key implication from this that current systemic combat models have overlooked
is that, in the model context, the proper role of the current state is to serve (in
the differential equations sense) as the initial conditions for that prediction. But
initial conditions presuppose the existence of a differential equation, i.e. a model,
that those conditions will apply to. That model, when solved with the appropriate
initial conditions, becomes a predictor of the future state of that system. The major
weakness in current systemic models that use only present-state decisionmaking is
that whatever the model predicts from the current state into the future remains
hidden, perhaps to the point of being only a vague notion in the mind of the analyst
who developed the program, rather than being explicitly included in the model, and
hence being open to examination.
IV. The Generalized Value System (GVS) - A Systemic Decisionmak-
ing Architecture
To address many of the perceived shortcomings in systemic models, particu-
larly those involved in higher (Corps and Division) level models, and in light of
the emergence of the US Army's Airland Battle doctrine, a group of faculty and
students at NPS initiated a research project whose goal was the development of
new methodologies appropriate for modelling combat under Airland Battle doc-
trine. This project, already mentioned above, is now titled the Airland Research
Model (ALARM) ([G], [12], [9]), and has three major components:
a. The development and refinement of network-oriented represents
tions and algorithms for modelling of combat processes,
b. The development of a Generalized Value System (GVS) foi mode]
decisionmaking which more accurately captures both the effects of the
temporal dimension which characterizes decisionmaking at higher com
mand levels and the highly heterogeneous nature of potential targets on
Corps-level Airland battlefield, and
c. The development of concepts and structures for implementing high-
level systemic combat models in a distributed computer processing envi-
ronment.
The GVS was originated by Schoenstadt and Parry [10] as part of an effort to
develop target selection algorithms which incorporated not only the current threat of
a target, but also its potential for threat in the future. This initial concept was then
expanded on by Kilmer [7] and others [4] to encompass not only weapon allocation
decisions, but force allocation ones as well. The result has been an evolution after
which we now mean by the term Generalized Value System ; t complete systemic
decisionmaking architecture, comprised of the following major element:
(1) For each model entity, an explicitly defined state vector, consisting
of quantifiable elements which the model is capable of representing.
(2) A plan or mission. This will be essentially a set of time, distance
and force-oriented constraints which a given model decisionmaker will try
to satisfy.
(3) A set of explicit algorithms which can produce predicted future
states of any given entity, given a present state.
(4) A set of algorithms for deriving a quantitative measure (oi mea
sures) of the value of any entity, given the state of that entity.
(5) A set of algorithms for converting a plan oi mission and a sel oi
current and future values into decisions.
We shall discuss all of these more extensively in latei sections. At this point. w<
would only reemphasize that we now view the GVS as an architecture a philosophj
of how to more accurately model systemic combat decisions rathei than a a
particular set of algorithms. Indeed, as we will point in later discussion, - veral of
the elements listed above are independent of each othei . and could be implemented
with more than one particular algorithm.
V. The State Vector
The first fundamental element in our future decisionmaking architecture is the
concept of the state vector. (Basically, this concept wa: introduced in [10].) By
the state of a model entity, we mean the quantitative values at a given time of all
those entity attributes which will be used in the model decision logic. Of course, in
actual military decisionmaking, the state encompasses both quantitative attributes
and other qualitative, or subjective attributes, e.g. morale. At this time we do
not expect that these attributes would be components of the model state vector,
even thought in actual military decisionmaking such factors can be critical. Such is
simply a limitation of models, and involves philosophical questions well beyond our
discussion here. We also simply feel that there is not any point in a model either
representing or predicting the future values of attributes that are not considered in
decisionmaking.
The actual number of different attributes composing the state vector and the
particular ones chosen are not particularly crucial to the overall architectural con-
cept, and may vary from model to model - their choice is really up to the modeler.
In the simplest of cases (as occurs with almost all current models), the state may be
nothing more than the number of operational weapons systems owned by that entity.
As a goal, a full}r realistic model should also include as well attributes that measure
at least the four basic combat service support functions of the Airland Battlefield -
manning, arming, fueling, and fixing the weapons systems. But the differences be-
tween a one-dimensional and a multidimensional state vector are differences only of
degree, not of fundamental concept. Practically, until we have more fully tested our
ideas in actual systemic models, we believe there is little point in confounding any
model tests by using more than a one-dimensional state vector. Furthermore, once
we have demonstrated the validity of our concepts using a one-dimensional vector,
the problems of implementing future-state decisionmaking using a multidimensional
state vector revolve around the development of credible prediction, valuation and
decisionmaking algorithms, rather than proving the basic soundness of the concept.
A fundamental difference between our view of the state vector and current
practice is that we view the state vector as a continually varying function of time,
with not only a current value, but also a past history, and, even more important, a
degree of future predictability. Almost all current models view the state (whether
they refer to it by this name or not) as purely the current value(s) of the model
attribute(s). To accent our view, we shall denote the state of the i l entity as:
<•>(*)
,
where the bold-facing indicates a (possibly) vector quantity. We again emphasize
that the dimension and specific components of the state vector are open to choice -
there is no stone tablet saying the state must be four-dimensional and consist of the
number of weapon systems, effective personnel strength, amount of ammunition.
and POL level.
VI. Plans, Missions, Constraints
As discussed earlier, we believe the proper role of the current state, in both
actual and model decisionmaking, is to act as a trigger for a planning process,
by causing a conclusion that "things are not going well." But this view requires
that the decisionmaker have an already formed or stated idea of what would be a
desireable future, so that he or she could decide whether a specific action would
"make things better." Or, more explicitly, future-state decisionmaking requires the
existence of some form of plan.
There should be nothing startling about this observation with respect to com-
bat modelling. According to doctrine, in an actual combat situation each level of
command would be operating in conformance with an operation plan (OPLAN) or






5. Command and Signal
The situation paragraph contains both information on the friendly task organi-
zation, including conditions and times of attachments and detachments, and on the
assumed enemy order of battle. The mission paragraph is usually a fairly general
statement of the goals or objectives of the operation and the general methods that
will be utilized to accomplish them, e.g. to conduct a defense in depth to destroy
attacking first-echelon divisions forward of a certain line. The execution paragraph
then follows with more specific tasks (missions) for subordinate units, and also with
a description of a scheme of maneuver, which is in general a time-phased descrip-
tion of how the commander views the battle as evolving. Lastly (for our purposes),
the service support paragraph contains information on logistical constraints, e.g.
ammunition controlled supply rates (CSR's), etc.
We would assert that if a systemic model is to make realistic and believable
decisions, based on a future-state decisionmaking model, then most of this same
information (or model analogs of it) must be available within the model. We fur-
ther assert that the nature of most "real-world" OPORDs and OPLANs dovetails
exceptionally well with the demands of future-state model decisionmaking. Actual
OPORD and OPLANs contain numerous time and distance-oriented control mea-
sures - phase lines, coordination points, release points, etc., that carry with them
explicit or implicit assumptions about what the situation or scenario will be al
that time. Furthermore, even many of the qualitative statements in an OPORD
or OPLAN have quantitative interpretations (although military operations research
experts are still arguing vehemently about the values used). For example, a Soviet-
style B>tt&cking force might be considered destroyed ifattrited to forty percent of its
full strength, while b US unit is frequently considered combat ineffective if it falls
below seventy percent of TDK. (The actual numbers arc not the issue only that
qualitative mission statements may he converted to reasonably credible quantitative
measures. The actual procedure(s) by such conversions would occur is beyond the
scope of this paper.
)
The act nal form and format ol a model plan would he the choice of the modeler,
just as are the components ol the state vector. The only fundamental restrictions
would seem to he that the model plan he time sequenced, involve only quantitatively
mensurable entity attributes, and express desired results in terms of either minimum
or maximum values ^\ quantities derivable from those attributes. For example, a
model plan might consist oi
(1) A sequence oi t imes /, ,
(2) For each /,,
(a) A mission during the time /, to /, i | .
(b) Sector boundaries during the tune /, to / l( | .
(c) A desired FLO V trace at /, .
(d) Planned friendly attachments/detachments at /, .
fe) Anticipated new enemy units introduced at /, .
ff) Minimum friendly unit states permissible at /, .
(g) Maximum enemy unit states permissible at /, .
W.un. tins list is noi necessarly either complete or exhaustive only illustrative.
The exact specification oi what should he included in a model plan is best deter
mined on b case by case basis.
VII. Future Slate Prediction Algorithms
The ability to predict or visualize tin" manner in which a particular action Or
sequence oi actions will affect the future is crucial to most planning. For example,
in the IS Army Command and General Staff College's structured decisionmaking
process called the Estimate of the Situation [15], this ability or pr< ess is referred to
BS WfkT (ninina; and is one of, it not the, key step by which B statl officer is supposed
to develop the advantages and disadvantages ^( b tactical course ol action. In the
model decisionmaking arena, this ability translates into having within the model
algorithms for predicting the future quantitative values oi the state vector s(t). As
we have alluded to before, herein lies what we feel is the fatal Raw in the present
state decisionmaking paradigm in present state decisionmaking these prediction
algorithms, together with all then assumptions, exist only in the programmer or
analyst's head and arc therefore not Subject to either examination or audit trail
when the actu&J combat model is executed,
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Many such quantitative algorithms in fact already exist and are in use in actual
combat planning situations. Much of FM 101-10-1 [13] is nothing more than a
collection of factors to perform exactly such computations. A similar comment
holds for Lanchester equations. In the extreme, a combat model might even call
itself to calculate the future resulting from a specific decision. (A similar procedure
was adopted by some of the early computerized chess-playing programs. There
are overwhelming practical reasons, however, while this idea should not be used in
combat models.)
Before proceeding with this, however, there is a need, which we hope will
become apparent shortly, to refine and expand our notation. The reason for this
is that while we are viewing the evolution of the state vector as analagous to a
trajectory in the ordinary differential equations sense, such a trajectory is uniquely
determined based on a single set of initial conditions only if the actual model is
both deterministic and completely known. In the combat modelling context, this
would make the only allowable prediction algorithm the running of the model itself,
and require both using "ground truth" for initial data and complete knowledge by
each side of the other's plans and decisionmaking algorithms. Clearly this is too
restrictive. We therefore need to distinguish between the actual state of an entity
at a particular time and predicted values of that state at the same time. We further
need to distinguish between the predicted values of the state of the same entity, but
based on predictions made at different times, or under different assumptions, since
these could easily be different.
We therefore introduce the following extension of the notation for the state
vector
B<;\t;S(tj),CA )
which stands for the value of the state vector s'^(t), predicted at tj based on a
perceived "state of the world" (denoted by S(tj)) and on an assumed course of
action CA . Note that the perceived state of the world and the assumed course of
action are, at least to a degree, independent. For example, the future state of a
battalion task force in the defense would clearly depend not only on its current
perceived strength (state), but also on how its higher command anticipated using
it, e.g. in an economy of force versus a terrain retention mission.




i\t;S(t j ),CA)^s (pi\t;S(t k ),CA ) , t } ± t k
due to changes in the perceived state of the world between tj and t k , even though
neither the actual state of the entity nor the course of action have changed. Fur-
thermore, such could happen even if the perceived state of the world agrees with
ground truth, because, assuming tj < tk, there is no guarantee that
s
{i\t k ) = sii) (t k ;S(tj ),CA ) ,
i.e. prediction does not have to be perfect. Lastly, as far as the prediction algorithms
themselves are concerned, it is irrelevant as to whether the perceived state of the
world used for prediction is ground truth or not - although such will clearly affect
the actual values predicted by the algorithms.
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In this figure, the state is one-dimensional and only a single entity is being consid-
ered, so the superscript (?) is not shown. The actual state is shown by the curve
s(t). The curves sp (t\ S(r 7 ). Ca ) an d sp (t; S(ijt), Ca) illustrate how the predicted
future state may change, based on when the prediction is made, even though ground
truth is used and the plan has not changed. (The reason of course, is that the fu-
ture did not evolve exactly as predicted during the time t } < t < t^-) The curves
sp (t\S(t j),Ca) and s r {t\S(t j). a) illustrate both how an incorrect perception of
the state of the world (i.e. lack of ground truth) and different courses of action may
lead to different predictions, even at / = t } itself.
As with deciding what are the appropriate components of the state vector, the
determination of specific prediction algorithms should be decided on a case-by-case,
model-by-model basis. Furthermore, the same basic type of algorithm does not
need to be used for each attribute. For example, FM 101-10-1 [13] data might be
used to predict POL levels, while Lanchester equations might be used to predict
attrition. We would anticipate that negative exponentials would figure frequently
in these algorithms however, both because of their ease of evaluation and because
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of the fact that they correspond to constant percentage changes per unit of time.
VIII. The Power or Value of an Entity
Previous sections have addressed the question of computing either the present
or future state of an entity. However, in actual operations, knowledge of the state of
the entities on the battlefield alone is not sufficient for military planning. There is
also a requirement for a single consistent measure of military utility which can de-
scribe the potential effectiveness of any entity or unit on the battlefield. The most
commonly used term for this measure in the military literature is combat power
[3]. As indicated in our preliminary discussion, an integral part of the GVS model
architecture is the existence of model algorithms that can compute such a quanti-
tative measure for each model entity, given the state of that entity. (The choice of
the word used here is to some degree, semantic. We shall use the term power for
the remainder of this paper. However, the reader who feels more comfortable with
either the term value or combat power is welcome to use that interpretation.)
Mathematically, such algorithms are simply transformations from a (generally)
multi-dimensional (state) space to a single (power) dimension. That such algorithms
are both necessary and appopriate can be argued from both model and "real-world"
considerations. Given today's state of the modeling art, it seems unlikely that mod-
els in the forseeable future will be able to implement decision logic other than either
"IF . . . THEN" trees (TDR's) or optimization of a single quantative figure of merit
(objective function) among competing options. Furthermore, today's interest in
computer-assisted multiattribute decisionmaking methods [5] strongly argues that
human decisionmakers are more comfortable in general when a multidimensional
decision has been projected down to a single point on a one-dimensional scale.
The scale used to measure power must, of course, be only relative. \\ hat is
crucial, especially for higher-level decisionmaking, is that the methodology be able
to produce a measure which is consistent over the wide diversity of entities and
units on the Airland battlefield. This last consideration was the major reason for
our earlier introduction of a much more limited version of the Generalized Value
System [10] designed to produce a measure of value for weapon allocation decisions.
As we have already commented, this idea was extended by Kilmer [7] to encompass
force allocation decisions as well. We shall use much of his terminology in the
subsequent discussion.
We feel that the development of a consistent system for the measure of power or
value on the Airland battlefield must start with three fundamental premises. These
premises recognize that, at the operational level, power must measure not only th<
power of combat forces but also the contribution of combat support and combat
service support forces. Furthermore, the measure must recognize the effects not
only of forces in contact or in position to fire or otherwise perform their mission,
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but also the potential power of forces (such as reserves and follow-on forces) that
are not in contact or position at the present, but may be at some time in the future.
The three premises, which were originally introduced in [10], and have been slightly
rephrased below, are:
The only entities with inherent power are maneuver and fire support.
Combat support and combat service support entities derive power
from the increase in the power of the maneuver and fire support units
they support.
The power of entities which are not in position to perform their com-
bat mission is a discounted value of the power they would have when in
position. The discounting factor is determined by the time interval before
they will be in position, ready to perform their combat mission.
In the GVS architecture, the starting point for determining power or value is
the determination of a power function which yields a numerical value for the power
of an entity, given the state of the entity at that time, assuming the entity is in




where s(t) is the state of the entity at time t, is up to the model developer or
analyst. In tests of these concepts which were implemented using the VIC model
[11], we used the VIC mass function and evaluated only maneuver units. Firepower
scores could also be used if desired. We would emphasize here, and this is crucial
to the understanding of GVS, that the purpose of this power function is not to
determine the ''winner' 1 of the battle. The purpose is solely to simulate that portion
of the doctrinal decisionmaking process [15] where the planner decides whether he
or she has enough assets to "do the job." This is a far less restrictive criterion
than determining battle outcome. Therefore any power function which produces
"reasonable" values for relative combat power would be acceptable.
One drawback, however, of using either firepower scores or the VIC mass func-
tion as the power function in a fully mature Airland Battle model is that the former
two are essentially based on a one-dimensional state vector. A recent exciting re-
sult in this area is a thesis by Crawford [2]. This thesis describes an experimental
methodology for determining a multidimensional mapping for the power function
(P(s(t))). The objective of this thesis was to determine the relative importance, in
terms of contribution to perceived combat power, of various system state (s(t)) at-
tributes to a decisionmaker's estimate of his unit's ability to accomplish its assigned
mission (Ca)- A four-dimensional state vector, encompassing personnel, vechicles,
ammunition and POL was considered. The Categorical Judgement Method [8] was
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used to analyze responses from sixty "judges" - all Army officers with field expe-
rience, to 144 combinations of state vector values. (A sample of the questionaire
and response form used is at Appendix A.) Using contour surface plot analysis, an
explicit formula (in terms of ellipsoids) was determined by least squares (regres-
sion) methods. The formula had a coefficient of determination (r 2 ) of 84% and a
standard deviation (a) of 6.41, indicating an excellent consensus among the "deci-
sionmakers." We feel this study demonstrates the feasibility of developing credible
power function mappings, based on military judgement, for the more general multi-
dimensional states necessary to fully describe all entities on the Airland battlefield.
(As an aside, we are also optimistic that Crawford's methodology has significant
potential to be incorporated into a decision aid for combat unit staff planners.)
Several of the various power representations introduced by Kilmer [7] can be
shown to be, in fact, special cases of this general power function. For example, if
5o(«)
denotes a combat unit whose state is 100% of authorized levels in all measured
attributes, then Kilmer's Basic Inherent Power (BIP) is simply
provided the unit is in position and conducting its primary mission against its most
likely threat. The two factors which will then cause an entity to be at other than
its BIP are
1. The unit is not at full authorized (TOE) levels, or
2. The unit is not in position to perform its mission, or both.
For combat units which are in position, but not at full authorized levels, the power
function
P(s(t))
produces the value which Kilmer called the Adjusted Basic Inherent Power (ABIP).
Furthermore, given the future state prediction algorithm described in Section VII,
the power function evaluated at the predicted future state of a combat entity in
contact at that time, i.e.
P(s p (US(t J )XA ))
becomes what Kilmer defines as the Predicted Adjusted Basic Inherent Power
(PABIP) of that unit.
In the GVS, unit power is degraded if the unit is not in position or available to
perform its mission at a given time. A major element of the GYS is computation
of this degradation by regarding a unit which, at time t, will not be in position to
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perform its mission until time tA , as analagous to financial assets which mature at
t A . That is, its power at time t is discounted from its power (PABIP), depending
on (t — t A ). This approach has the advantages both that discounting of future
assets is a well-recognized procedure and that normal (i.e. by a fixed percentage)
discounting corresponds to exponential decay of value.
Thus, Kilmer's Situationally Inherent Power (SIP) at some time t is in fact
P(sp (t;S(tj),CA ))e
-D(t A -t)
where D is chosen so that entities which are more than some prescribed time interval
from being in position have only negligible amounts of power. These predicted future
values of the SIP form the basis under the GVS methodology for making decisions
on courses of action.
IX. GVS-Based Decision-making
As outlined above, the final element of the GVS architecture involves the use
of the computed current and future values, together with whatever plans, missions
or constraints exist, to arrive at decisions. We feel that a great deal of additional
research will be required in this area to identify the most suitable algorithms. Fur-
thermore, since the GVS is an architecture rather than a rigid set of prescribed
formulas, it is quite possible that multiple acceptable alternative decisionmaking
algorithms will emerge, depending on the particular model considered. The funda-
mental requirements are first that the algorithms must all consider the projected
future states, not only the present state. Secondly, they must produce a clearly
understandable audit trail. Thirdly, a certain time interval, called the planning
horizon, must be specified. At any time when a decision is being considered, the
prediction algorithms must first be invoked to extrapolate the current state out to
the planning horizon. Lastly, based on the SIP's computed, as well as the mission
and constraints specified, an evaluation must be made as to whether or not the
predicted future state conforms to the plan. If so, no decision need be made. If not,
another algorithm must then be invoked to determine how to restore conformity to
the plan at tha cime.
In this section we present an example, taken from Crawford [2], of GVS-based
decisionmaking. The example is minimal in that only a single option (other than
no change) is considered, although later papers will discuss the situation of multiple
options.
In this example, a heterogeneous Blue force is defending against a heteroge-
neous attacking Red force. Both forces are initially at full strength, with the Red
force located 16,200 meters from the Blue force and advancing at a rate of 270
meters per minute. We further assume that the Blue force has a BIP (full TOE) of
1000 units when defending, and the Red force a BIP of 2000 while attacking. The
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Blue mission will be to retain a superiority of power at the FLOT, and the Blue
planning horizon is assumed to be sixty minutes. The Red force is assumed to be
able to fire effective artillery preparation at a range of approximately 8,000 meters
(or in about thirty minutes). We consider this to be the position when they are in
contact. The constant D is chosen so that Red forces thirty minutes from contact






(We would comment that the thirty minute figure was chosen by Crawford, and is
probably unreasonably low.)
The state vector for each force consists of four elements - personnel, ammuni-
tion, POL, and vehicles. The forces are assumed to be subject to attrition at two
different rates - one during the period t = to t — 30, the second during t = 30 to
t = 60 (after contact is made). The rates used are shown in Table 1. These rates
are abitrarily assigned, but reflect the idea that during the time from t = until
t = 30, the losses on both sides are due mainly to harassing artillery fire plus Red
vehicle breakdown, while after t = 30 the losses increase due to artillery preparation
and the direct fire battle. This table becomes the effective future state prediction
algorithm. Based on the predicted attrited states, Crawford's fitted power function
(DPF) [2] is used to produce predicted powers. The predicted powers out to t = 60
are shown in Figure 2.
Table 1. BLUE AND RED FORCES ATTRITION RATES PER MINUTE
Time
(Min)
Blue Forces Red Forces
PER AMMO VEH POL PER AMMO VEH POL
0- 30 0.333 0.500 0.000 0.333 0.167 0.067 0.067 0.333
30- 60 1.333 1.500 1.333 0.333 1.700 2.433 1.800 0.333











Present time in the example (= 0)
Length of planning horizon (= 60min)
Time until Red Force is in position (= 30 min)
Discounting constant
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The following then hold:
liP{s"(t p )) = BIP° = 1000
P{s !i {t p )) = BIP* = 2000
P(s B (t;S B (t p ),CA )) = PABIP
B
= \000*DPF(s B (t;S(t p ),CA ))
P(s R (t;S R (t p ),CA )) = PABIP
R
= 2000*DPF(s R (t;S(t p ),CA ))
SIP B = PADIP B
•{. f PABIP R e " D(^-0 ,t p <t<t A
' PABIP R ,tA <t
(Note that since the Blue force is initially in position, and since the decisionmaking
is made from the Blue point of view, the Blue SIP is never discounted.)
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BLUE VERSUS RED




-RED FORCES ? ''•.I
«-
— (RED SIP - BLUE SIP)
30 40
T ( MINUTES )
Figure 2 Predicted Blue Versus Red Battle
The predicted computed power curves for this example are shown in Figure 2.
Note as the Red force moves into its attack position, its SIP increases, but with
some degradation due to the attrition effects on the state vector. Once the Red
force commences the attack, the attrition rate increases and their SIP (which is no
1C
longer discounted since they are now in contact) reduces correspondingly due to the
losses. As the attacker, we expect their power to erode relatively faster than that
of the defender. Even so, in this figure, because of Red's initial greater basic power
(BIP), the attrition algorithm predicts that by t — 60 the Red force's SIP will equal
Blue force's, and therefore the Blue commander will not have met his constraint.
However, because the Blue commander predicts at t = that by t = 60 he will
not be able to accomplish his mission, he will have to plan some action to alter the
predicted future. For example, he may request reinforcements, which must then
arrive before t = 60. The predicted power curves for such a course of action are
displayed in Figure 3. In this figure, the same basic powers, movement rates and
attritions were assumed for the initial Blue and Red forces, and the reinforcements
were assumed to have a BIP of 1000 and to arrive at t = 30. As the figure shows,
the Blue force is now able to meet the mission of retaining a superiority of (combat)
power over Red.
BLUE VERSUS RED
SIP AS A FUNCTION OF THE
BLUE FORCES —-».















Figure 3 Predicted Blue Versus Red Battle With Blue Reinforcements
While this example is extremely artificial, it nevertheless illustrates the funda-
mental element of the GYS decisionmaking architecture. Future state forecasting is
the only way the Blue force commander can decide at t — to initiate commitment
17
of a reserve so as to realize success at / = CO. Decision tables based on the state at
t - would almost never capture this, without significant "hard- wiring." Further-
more, if, after the actual execution model of the battle were run, Blue did not in
fact accomplish his assigned mission, the GVS architecture would allow an analyst
to determine exactly where and why the actual evolved state(s) differed from the
prediction, and decide whether a "fix" needs to be implemented - e.g. the attrition
rates used may have been incorrect.
I. Summary and Conclusions
This report has examined what we believe is a fundamental flaw in current
systemic combat models the present-state decisionmaking paradigm. We believe
this paradigm is basically flawed because it is not realistic (except perhaps at the
platoon level and below) and because it relies on hidden models. We have also
proposed what we believe is a viable alternative - the future-state decisionmaking
architecture of the Generalized Value System [GVS]. We believe we have shown
that this architecture is more realistic than present-state decisionmaking, that it
is practical to implement, and that it is the only currently available alternative to
present State decisionmaking.
As we have outlined it here, the GVS architecture requires five (dements - a
defined state vector; explicit algorithms for predicting that state into the future;
algorithms for converting state into a one-dimensional measure of power; a plan
against which future states and powers can be compared; and lastly algorithms for
making decisions based on the plan and projected future powers. There is still a
great deal more research remaining to be done on this architecture, ("specially on
decision algorithms tor this paradigm. However, based on preliminary results to
date, we are highly optimistic that the GVS architecture oilers the promise of a
significant qualitative improvement in higher Level systemic combat models.
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLE QUESTIONA1RE
A. PURPOSE & MOTIVATION
The purpose of this questionaire is to obtain an estimate of the degradation in a
units effectiveness based on the threat posed, by the degradation in the 4 key variables
of a unit. This questionaire will not just be used as a subject for a thesis and later
diregarded. It is to be used to help the S-3 and decision maker to determine if he can
handle a mission based on 4 key factors. Your answers are therefore very important to
insure a good decision is made. You answers, as the decision maker, of the percent de-
gradation of your units effectiveness based on the changes to these key variables is a
measure of the relative importance of each variable to the accomplishment of your
mission. Your answers will also help to develop a more accurate and realistic represen-
tation of how changes to the key variables effect your view of its relative importance.
1. Key Variables
The 4 key variables used throughout this questionaire are:
% Personnel,
% Ammo,
% Weapon Systems / Combat Vehicles, and
% POL (Fuel) .
2. Instructions
In the remainder of this questionaire, you will be asked to place yourself in the
role of the decision maker of the unit and determine how changes to your units fuel,
ammo, personnel and vehicles will effect your interpretation of your units ability to ac-
complish its assigned mission.
Please respond to the questions asked in accordance with your feelings regard-
ing the situation. There is no right or wrong answer to any of the questions. As a de-
cision maker in a combat situation you will be required to make rapid estimates of the
situation. Therefore, with this in mind you should only take enough time to fully un-
derstand the situation presented and record your response. Once you have recorded a
response you should not change your response.
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You will receive an example question and two practice questions. You are then
asked to answer 48 questions by putting an X under the response you feel best de-
scribes the unit's ability to accomplish its assigned mission.
Based on the following situation you will be asked to answer questions on the
degree to which you determine your unit is able to accomplish its assigned mission. Use
the following situation to answer all of the questions in this survey.
Situation
1. Enemy - 127th Motorized Rillc Regiment.
2. Friendly - Your unit 2nd Bn 41st Inf Mech is currently conducting deliberate de-
fensive operations along the forward line of troops (FLOT).
• Your unit is presently in prepared defensive positions.
• Your unit is the forward unit. i.e. no units to your front.
• Y'our unit is currently engaged in combat with the enemy.
Mission
Your unit 2/41st Inf (M) will conduct a deliberate defense of present positions
for a minimum of 24 hours, longer if possible, to prevent the enemy from controlling this
key terrain.
Based on the above scenario and mission answer the following questions.
B. EXAMPLE OF THE RESPONSE FORM
***************************************************************
THE CURRENT STATUS OF YOUR UNIT IS :
75% PERSONNEL,
25% AMMUNITION,
50% WEAPON SYSTEMS, and
50% POL (FUEL) .
BASED ON THIS STATUS, INDICATE BELOW THE CURRENT EFFECTIVENESS
OF YOUR UNIT'S ABILITY TO CONTINUE TO ACCOMPLISH ITS CURRENT
MISSION OF DELIBERATE DEFENSE.
TOTALLY TOTALLY
EFFECTIVE EFFECTIVE MARGINAL INEFFECTIVE INEFFECTIVE
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